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The civil war in Syria has entered its ninth year and for the time being it 
seems that the preservation of the authoritarian regime headed by Bashar al-Assad 
is going to be its final outcome. Many ask what future awaits Syria and the Middle 
East afterwards. In parallel, Dmitri Trenin, the Director of Carnegie Moscow Cen-
ter, raises a more fundamental question about the geopolitical implications of this 
conflict. In his essay-turned-book What is Russia up to in the Middle East?, Trenin 
draws the reader’s attention to the fact that the conflict in Syria has “global conse-
quences” (p. 1). To him, Kremlin has intervened there not only to save a client au-
thoritarian regime, but to assert itself in the region, which serves as a microcosm of 
the XXI century global politics. From the author’s perspective, “for the past 25 
years, Russia is unexpectedly back in the game, and with gusto” (p. 2). But is it? 
To develop his argument, Trenin analyzes the new-found Russian en-
gagement in the Middle East through four different macro-domains which are nei-
ther mutually exclusive nor have the intention of being exhaustive: “History,” 
“War,” “Diplomacy” and “Trade.”  
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In the first chapter, devoted to what the author calls a “rich historical ex-
perience with the Middle East,” Trenin aims to illustrate how Russian elites have 
learned from their past mistakes in the region and currently play a more nuanced 
strategy. To show how incomparable strategies of Vladimir Putin’s administration 
are to their Soviet and Czarist predecessors’, he takes the reader on a historical tour 
starting with Moscow’s presumed inheritance from Byzantium in the mid-XV cen-
tury, moving to Russian spiritual presence in the Levant through a Russian Palestin-
ian Society formed in 1882, and infamous involvement of the foreign minister 
Sazanov in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1915. Later on, Trenin fast-tracks through 
a brief Soviet-Egyptian love affair under Nasser, and then traces how, after the dis-
solution of USSR, Russia took a step back from the global stage and the region to 
return 25 years later with an intervention in Syria, taking a stand against perceived 
Western-orchestrated regime changes of the Arab Spring and Color Revolutions.  
Though informative for first-time readers, the chapter fails in achieving its 
goal and substantiating how the political learning process occur and how history in-
forms the decisions of incumbent Russian elites. Instead, at many points the chapter 
offers vivid, but non-substantiated generalizations and metaphors, which in fact do 
little to help the reader untangle the complicated causal mechanisms behind Russian 
involvement in the Middle East. Propositions like “sparks from the Arab revolu-
tions could ignite Russia’s geopolitical underbelly” (p. 42) often remain pundit-type 
one-liners without further elaboration.  
On “War,” Trenin traces Russian military engagement in Syria since Sep-
tember 2015. Here he rightfully pinpoints that saving al-Assad was instrumentalised 
for engaging the U.S. as peers. The author does a good job in describing how the 
latest Russian military campaign is different from any of the previous ones: Russia 
shares no direct border with Syria, fights an air war and in parallel aims to lead dip-
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lomatic efforts to solve the conflict. However, some propositions found in the 
chapter are highly debatable. For instance, Trenin argues, that “at the cost of the 
equivalent of $4 million a day, the military intervention in Syria has been reasonably 
affordable to the Russian budget” (p. 79). Taking the ensuing domestic protests and 
discontent over the raise of retirement age in Russia (Kluge 2018) into account, “af-
fordable” sounds highly questionable.  
Moreover, Trenin pays no attention to private war companies in Syria 
(Sukhankin 2018), which misses an important aspect of modern Russian warfare 
and extra costs of its heightened ”international prestige.” Finally, Trenin misreads 
the situation by calling Syria Putin’s “war of choice.” He maintains that the likely 
collapse of the Syrian state and parallel victory of jihadi groups were too dangerous 
to be allowed in Putin’s view, because he “rose to the leadership of Russia an im-
placable fighter against terrorist and other jihadis, ready to go all the way to do them 
in” (p. 58). Many would argue that this is a naïve reading of Kremlin’s strategical 
calculations, since it has previously domesticated groups that may be perceived as 
“terrorist” and instrumentalised them for keeping a grip on power at home. As the 
most vivid example, the current administration in Chechnya is headed by Ramzan 
Kadyrov, a former participant in a jihad against the same Russian regime. 
In the third chapter, the author looks at Moscow’s diplomatic initiatives 
and highlights its ability to talk to conflicting sides at the same time and keep the 
appearance of an “honest broker.” Chapter is built on a series of circumscribed case 
studies of Russia’s (possible) involvement in main regional conflicts (such as Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, disputes between Iran and Israel, Turkey and the Kurds, Iran 
and the Gulf States), which to a more expert readership may appear rather shallow. 
Trenin concludes that “the Russians with their vaunted pragmatism and a fair share 
of cynicism, appear well-suited for this environment” (p. 110) and suggests that 
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while Moscow does not have a grand strategy for the Middle East, by successfully 
negotiating regional divides it could deliver ‘public goods’ and establish itself as a 
true great power globally. Though thought-provoking, Trenin makes it obvious that 
these “public goods” would only come about as side-effects of Kremlin pushing for 
its own interests in the region. How these positive externalities could work in prac-
tice, remains to be substantiated. 
On “Trade,” in the light of poorly diversified Russian economy, the chap-
ter focuses on four sectors (energy products, metals, timber and food) and aims to 
convey the added value of doing business with Middle Eastern countries after im-
position of Western sanctions in return of Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine in 
2014. Nonetheless, the overview remains more of a mapping exercise and does not 
flesh out any theoretical implications. However, it touches upon an interesting peo-
ple-to-people linkage, encompassing diverse aspects such as political influence of 
Russian speakers in Israel, symbolic importance of the Holy Land for the tradition-
alist ideology of Putin regime, cultural and economic encounters Russians have with 
the Middle East by simply going there as tourists, as well as the impact of the Arab 
world on Russia’s Muslim communities. This has so far stayed out of the main-
stream academic and policy debates, concerned more with regime dynamics and in-
teractions of political elites rather than transnational social connections, and de-
serves a deeper look in further reiterations of the essay. 
Concluding and to some degree self-contradicting, Trenin again states that 
although Moscow does not have a Grand Strategy in the Middle East, it “has 
demonstrated that a combination of a clear sense of objective, strong political will, 
area expertise [...] can go a long way to help to project power onto the top level” (p. 
134). For scholars of the subject, this as much as the rest of the essay, hardly pro-
vides any eye-opening arguments. However, What is Russia up to in the Middle East? 
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should serve as a good source for students and the general public aiming to orien-
tate themselves in the nuances of the regional developments of Russian foreign pol-
icy. Hopefully, the sketch provided in the essay will be substantiated in its next reit-
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